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Article: Prisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity markets
Title | Prisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity markets |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Electricity markets Market efficiency Prisoner dilemma Stochastic optimal control |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Publisher | IEEE. |
Citation | Ieee Transactions On Automatic Control, 2007, v. 52 n. 6, p. 1143-1149 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Because of nonstorability of electric energy, temporal effects are important in electricity markets. Demand fluctuation and generator outages cause stochastic behaviors in the market. Therefore, viewing the generation competition as a dynamic and stochastic game, rather than the traditional static deterministic game commonly considered in economics seems more appropriate. This paper studies the generator bidding using stochastic optimal control formulations. A stochastic and dynamic feedback system is proposed to model generation competition and then a stochastic optimal control problem is formulated to investigate individual's optimization behavior. With the proposed approach, two interesting issues are addressed: 1) what is the effect of generators' strategic behaviors on individual's payoffs, and 2) how market efficiency evolves with generators' strategic behavior. The result shows that that generators' strategic behaviors have positive effects on market efficiency and demonstrates that the evolution of individual's payoffs w.r.t. generators' strategic behavior resembles a game of "Prisoner Dilemma." © 2007 IEEE. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/73768 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.501 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Liu, Y | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Wu, FF | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-06T06:54:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-06T06:54:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | Ieee Transactions On Automatic Control, 2007, v. 52 n. 6, p. 1143-1149 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issn | 0018-9286 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/73768 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Because of nonstorability of electric energy, temporal effects are important in electricity markets. Demand fluctuation and generator outages cause stochastic behaviors in the market. Therefore, viewing the generation competition as a dynamic and stochastic game, rather than the traditional static deterministic game commonly considered in economics seems more appropriate. This paper studies the generator bidding using stochastic optimal control formulations. A stochastic and dynamic feedback system is proposed to model generation competition and then a stochastic optimal control problem is formulated to investigate individual's optimization behavior. With the proposed approach, two interesting issues are addressed: 1) what is the effect of generators' strategic behaviors on individual's payoffs, and 2) how market efficiency evolves with generators' strategic behavior. The result shows that that generators' strategic behaviors have positive effects on market efficiency and demonstrates that the evolution of individual's payoffs w.r.t. generators' strategic behavior resembles a game of "Prisoner Dilemma." © 2007 IEEE. | en_HK |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.publisher | IEEE. | en_HK |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control | en_HK |
dc.rights | ©2007 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. | en_HK |
dc.subject | Electricity markets | en_HK |
dc.subject | Market efficiency | en_HK |
dc.subject | Prisoner dilemma | en_HK |
dc.subject | Stochastic optimal control | en_HK |
dc.title | Prisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity markets | en_HK |
dc.type | Article | en_HK |
dc.identifier.openurl | http://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0018-9286&volume=52 No 6&spage=1143&epage=1149&date=2007&atitle=Prisoner+Dilemma:+Generator+Strategic+Bidding+in+Electricity+Markets | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Wu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Wu, FF=rp00194 | en_HK |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TAC.2007.899035 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-34447124405 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 132723 | en_HK |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-34447124405&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_HK |
dc.identifier.volume | 52 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issue | 6 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.spage | 1143 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.epage | 1149 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000247353300025 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Liu, Y=22835324100 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Wu, FF=7403465107 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0018-9286 | - |