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Conference Paper: A unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency
Title | A unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2009 |
Citation | The 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory, Taipei, Taiwan, 17-19 August 2009. How to Cite? |
Abstract | Ching and Serizawa (1998) showed that the single-plateaued domain is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry,and efficiency, but pointed out that strategy-proofness becomes redundant when symmetry is strengthened to strong symmetry (which is weaker than anonymity), i.e. the single-plateaued domain remains the unique maximal domain for strong symmetry and efficiency. In this paper, efficiency is relaxed to unanimity and continuity. The weakly monotonic single-peaked domain is identified as the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, strong symmetry, unanimity, and continuity. Strategy-proofness can no longer be dropped in this result. The tie between strategy-proofness and single-peakedness is restored. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/114939 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ching, S | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-26T05:22:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-26T05:22:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | The 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory, Taipei, Taiwan, 17-19 August 2009. | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/114939 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Ching and Serizawa (1998) showed that the single-plateaued domain is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry,and efficiency, but pointed out that strategy-proofness becomes redundant when symmetry is strengthened to strong symmetry (which is weaker than anonymity), i.e. the single-plateaued domain remains the unique maximal domain for strong symmetry and efficiency. In this paper, efficiency is relaxed to unanimity and continuity. The weakly monotonic single-peaked domain is identified as the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, strong symmetry, unanimity, and continuity. Strategy-proofness can no longer be dropped in this result. The tie between strategy-proofness and single-peakedness is restored. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.relation.ispartof | 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory 2009 | en_HK |
dc.title | A unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency | en_HK |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Ching, S: steve.ching@hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Ching, S=rp01056 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 164280 | en_HK |