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Conference Paper: Investing in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Building
Title | Investing in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Building |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2003 |
Publisher | Western Economic Association International |
Citation | Western Economic Association International 5th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 9-12 January 2003 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In many occupations, reputation or past performance affects the demand for a worker’s output,
creating an incentive to invest in reputation early in a career. This results in a tendency for
superior workers to start their career in the mainstream market. The intuition is that, for high
ability workers, the returns to investing in reputation is larger in the mass market, while less able
ones would avoid the more competitive mainstream by developing their specializations in the
fringe market. Some mainstream workers may enter the fringe market once the motive to invest
in reputation diminishes later in their careers, but less able workers who start in the fringe are
seldom able to return to the mainstream. These results are empirically testable and have potential
implications for product markets as well. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/114948 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chan, W | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Suen, WC | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-26T05:23:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-26T05:23:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | Western Economic Association International 5th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 9-12 January 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/114948 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In many occupations, reputation or past performance affects the demand for a worker’s output, creating an incentive to invest in reputation early in a career. This results in a tendency for superior workers to start their career in the mainstream market. The intuition is that, for high ability workers, the returns to investing in reputation is larger in the mass market, while less able ones would avoid the more competitive mainstream by developing their specializations in the fringe market. Some mainstream workers may enter the fringe market once the motive to invest in reputation diminishes later in their careers, but less able workers who start in the fringe are seldom able to return to the mainstream. These results are empirically testable and have potential implications for product markets as well. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.publisher | Western Economic Association International | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Western Economic Association International Biennial Pacific Rim Conference | en_HK |
dc.title | Investing in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Building | en_HK |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Chan, W: wchan@econ.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Suen, WC: wsuen@econ.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Chan, W=rp01049 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Suen, WC=rp00066 | en_HK |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 131126 | en_HK |