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Conference Paper: Why Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates
Title | Why Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Publisher | The Econometric Society. |
Citation | The Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second
choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in
which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate
from a private signal. I show that if private signals are su¢ ciently precise,
an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate
increases. In this unique equlibrium, supporters of a candidate vote more
strategically when their hate for their worst choice becomes more domi-
nant, but they vote less strategically when the same is true for the opposite
camp. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning
early primaries improves a candidate s chance of winning later primaries
by making his supporters in later primaries vote more sincerely. I show
that sequential primaries help with coordination, but puts more weight on
the preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters
worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are
better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries. |
Description | Session ID 38: Political Economy |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/166257 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lo, P | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T08:30:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T08:30:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | The Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/166257 | - |
dc.description | Session ID 38: Political Economy | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are su¢ ciently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equlibrium, supporters of a candidate vote more strategically when their hate for their worst choice becomes more domi- nant, but they vote less strategically when the same is true for the opposite camp. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate s chance of winning later primaries by making his supporters in later primaries vote more sincerely. I show that sequential primaries help with coordination, but puts more weight on the preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | The Econometric Society. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings | en_US |
dc.title | Why Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates | en_US |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Lo, P: peiyulo@hkucc.hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Lo, P=rp01080 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 209169 | en_US |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |