Three Puzzles about Conforming Upwards

Abstract

The Mohists‘ defense of their doctrine of conforming upwards appeals to a sort of state of nature. They claim that the widespread conflict and disorder in this state of nature led people to choose the most worthy among them to rule them as emperor. What is most striking about this argument is that it appeals not to conflicts between people‘s interests but to moral disagreement: in the Mohists‘ state of nature, everyone disagreed morally with everyone, and this is what led to conflict and disorder. This argument raises three difficult puzzles: 1. How could moral disagreement cause as much conflict and disorder as it is supposed to in the Mohists‘ state of nature? 2. How could people who disagreed so extensively about what is right nonetheless agree about who is most worthy to be selected as emperor? 3. What guarantees that the person chosen as most worthy would hold specifically Mohist views about what is right (as clearly the Mohists assume he would)? This paper defends a solution to these puzzles that turns on the idea that we tend to moralise our desires so that conflicts between our desires tend to manifest in moral disagreements. (For example, if you take something that I want, that might be enough for me to judge that you have done something morally wrong.) It will follow that when the emperor unifies the world‘s moral norms, he is in a way also in a way harmonising their desires. I conclude that the resulting harmony is most fully expressed in the Mohists‘ doctrine of inclusive care.