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- Publisher Website: 10.1109/CloudCom.2013.93
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84899719623
- WOS: WOS:000352075800088
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Conference Paper: A Study of Competitive Cloud Resource Pricing under a Smart Grid Environment
Title | A Study of Competitive Cloud Resource Pricing under a Smart Grid Environment |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Cloud computing competitive resource pricing Dynamic game game theory resource allocation |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Publisher | I E E E, Computer Society. |
Citation | The 5th IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom 2013), Bristo, United Kingdom, 2-5 December 2013. In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science, 2013, v. 1, p. 655-662, article no. 6753858 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In the current IaaS cloud market, to achieve profit maximization, multiple cloud providers compete non-cooperatively by offering diverse price rates. At the same time, tenant consumers judiciously adjust demands accordingly, which in turn affects cloud resource prices. In this paper, we tackle this fundamental but daunting cloud price competition problem with Bertrand game modeling, and propose a dynamic game to achieve Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner. Specifically, we realistically consider spot electricity prices under a smart grid environment, and systematically investigate the impact of different system parameters such as network delay, renewable availability, and cloud resource substitutability. We also perform stability analysis to investigate the convergence of the proposed dynamic game to Nash equilibrium. Cooperation among cloud providers can achieve aggregate cloud profit maximization, but is subject to strategic manipulations. We then propose our Striker strategy to stimulate cooperation, the efficiency of which is validated by repeated game analysis. Our evaluation is augmented with realistic electricity prices in the spot energy market, and reveals insightful observations for both theoretic analysis and practical pricing scheme design. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/204073 |
ISBN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Jin, X | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Kwok, YK | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yan, Y | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-09-19T20:04:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-09-19T20:04:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | The 5th IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom 2013), Bristo, United Kingdom, 2-5 December 2013. In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science, 2013, v. 1, p. 655-662, article no. 6753858 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780769550954 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/204073 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the current IaaS cloud market, to achieve profit maximization, multiple cloud providers compete non-cooperatively by offering diverse price rates. At the same time, tenant consumers judiciously adjust demands accordingly, which in turn affects cloud resource prices. In this paper, we tackle this fundamental but daunting cloud price competition problem with Bertrand game modeling, and propose a dynamic game to achieve Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner. Specifically, we realistically consider spot electricity prices under a smart grid environment, and systematically investigate the impact of different system parameters such as network delay, renewable availability, and cloud resource substitutability. We also perform stability analysis to investigate the convergence of the proposed dynamic game to Nash equilibrium. Cooperation among cloud providers can achieve aggregate cloud profit maximization, but is subject to strategic manipulations. We then propose our Striker strategy to stimulate cooperation, the efficiency of which is validated by repeated game analysis. Our evaluation is augmented with realistic electricity prices in the spot energy market, and reveals insightful observations for both theoretic analysis and practical pricing scheme design. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | I E E E, Computer Society. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science | en_US |
dc.subject | Cloud computing | - |
dc.subject | competitive resource pricing | - |
dc.subject | Dynamic game | - |
dc.subject | game theory | - |
dc.subject | resource allocation | - |
dc.title | A Study of Competitive Cloud Resource Pricing under a Smart Grid Environment | en_US |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Kwok, YK: ykwok@eee.hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Kwok, YK=rp00128 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/CloudCom.2013.93 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84899719623 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 238457 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 655, article no. 6753858 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 662, article no. 6753858 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000352075800088 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |