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Conference Paper: Volition and the function of consciousness
Title | Volition and the function of consciousness |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2009 |
Citation | Faith and Philosophy, 2009, v. 26, n. 5 SPEC. ISSUE, p. 537-552 How to Cite? |
Abstract | People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.Copyright © 2009 The Society of Christian Philosophers. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/242590 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.238 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lau, Hakwan | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-10T10:51:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-10T10:51:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Faith and Philosophy, 2009, v. 26, n. 5 SPEC. ISSUE, p. 537-552 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0739-7046 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/242590 | - |
dc.description.abstract | People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.Copyright © 2009 The Society of Christian Philosophers. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Faith and Philosophy | - |
dc.title | Volition and the function of consciousness | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84875422250 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 26 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 SPEC. ISSUE | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 537 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 552 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2153-3393 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0739-7046 | - |