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Conference Paper: The Varieties of Philosophical Expertise
Title | The Varieties of Philosophical Expertise |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | Conference 'Intuitions and the Expertise Defense', Århus, Denmark, 13-15 September 2017 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Proponents of the expertise defense have often tended to link philosophical expertise with improved intuition - thus potentially undermining the claims of 'negative' experimental philosophy. Authors like Deutsch and Cappelen, meanwhile, have denied that intuition plays a substantive role in philosophical theorizing. I'll try to present a view of philosophical expertise that is, first, more amenable to the Deutsch/Cappelen view of philosophical inquiry, and second, perfectly compatible with the ambitions of negative experimental philosophers. On my view, philosophers do possess a variety of forms of expertise - but many of these are non-intuitive, and none of them suffice to undermine the challenge of experimental philosophy. |
Description | Keynote lecture - Venue: Aarhus University |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/268994 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Nado, J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-09T04:33:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-09T04:33:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Conference 'Intuitions and the Expertise Defense', Århus, Denmark, 13-15 September 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/268994 | - |
dc.description | Keynote lecture - Venue: Aarhus University | - |
dc.description.abstract | Proponents of the expertise defense have often tended to link philosophical expertise with improved intuition - thus potentially undermining the claims of 'negative' experimental philosophy. Authors like Deutsch and Cappelen, meanwhile, have denied that intuition plays a substantive role in philosophical theorizing. I'll try to present a view of philosophical expertise that is, first, more amenable to the Deutsch/Cappelen view of philosophical inquiry, and second, perfectly compatible with the ambitions of negative experimental philosophers. On my view, philosophers do possess a variety of forms of expertise - but many of these are non-intuitive, and none of them suffice to undermine the challenge of experimental philosophy. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Conference 'Intuitions and the Expertise Defense' | - |
dc.title | The Varieties of Philosophical Expertise | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Nado, J: nado@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Nado, J=rp02287 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287067 | - |