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Conference Paper: Philosophy Sometimes Relies on Intuitions
Title | Philosophy Sometimes Relies on Intuitions |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | 科学基礎論学会 2017年度 秋の研究例会 = Conference of Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, Tokyo, Japan, 21 October 2017 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Max Deutsch’s book The Myth of the Intuitive questions, rightfully, the standard picture of philosophical methodology – one upon which our primary methods revolve around the use of the so-called ‘method of cases’. Supposedly, when we employ the ‘method of cases’, we rely on our intuitions to evaluate whether an imagined case forms a counterexample to a proposed philosophical analysis. I agree with Deutsch that this picture mischaracterizes the true methods of philosophy. But on my view, intuitions still play a fairly central role in philosophy – though sometimes only indirectly. I argue that the role played by intuition in philosophy is sufficient to ground the worries that have been raised by experimental philosophers. However, I also think argue that experimental philosophers have been somewhat too ambitious in their aims – we do not, I think, need to burn the armchair. |
Description | Invited lecture - 開催校: 日本大学文理学部 |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269004 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Nado, J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-09T06:49:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-09T06:49:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 科学基礎論学会 2017年度 秋の研究例会 = Conference of Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, Tokyo, Japan, 21 October 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269004 | - |
dc.description | Invited lecture - 開催校: 日本大学文理学部 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Max Deutsch’s book The Myth of the Intuitive questions, rightfully, the standard picture of philosophical methodology – one upon which our primary methods revolve around the use of the so-called ‘method of cases’. Supposedly, when we employ the ‘method of cases’, we rely on our intuitions to evaluate whether an imagined case forms a counterexample to a proposed philosophical analysis. I agree with Deutsch that this picture mischaracterizes the true methods of philosophy. But on my view, intuitions still play a fairly central role in philosophy – though sometimes only indirectly. I argue that the role played by intuition in philosophy is sufficient to ground the worries that have been raised by experimental philosophers. However, I also think argue that experimental philosophers have been somewhat too ambitious in their aims – we do not, I think, need to burn the armchair. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | 科学基礎論学会 秋の研究例会 = Conference of Japan Association for Philosophy of Science | - |
dc.title | Philosophy Sometimes Relies on Intuitions | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Nado, J: nado@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Nado, J=rp02287 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287071 | - |