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Conference Paper: A Yogācāra Response to Madhyamaka Illusionism About Consciousness

TitleA Yogācāra Response to Madhyamaka Illusionism About Consciousness
Authors
Issue Date2019
Citation
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality: Lessons from East Asian Philosophy Conference, Sun-Yat Sen University, Zhuhai, China, 11-13 June 2019 How to Cite?
AbstractJay Garfield has recently endorsed the bold claim of Illusionism about consciousness, which is that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. Any impression of direct access to a private inner life of phenomenal states is simply a conjuring trick of the brain. Further, to commit the cognitive error of thinking there are internal conscious states with a subjective phenomenal character is to fall prey to another pernicious illusion, namely the Myth of the Given. Of special interest is the support for Illusionism Garfield draws from the Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu and his Treatise on the Three Natures (Trisvabhāvanirdeśa). Against Garfield, I argue first that he miscontrues Yogācāra claims about the fundamental reality of consciousness, and that his Illusionism actually find more philosophical support from Madhyamaka Buddhism. Second, I offer a broader response against both Madhyamaka and Garfield by revisiting the Yogācāra notion of dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). This notion takes consciousness to be ultimately real even as it arises within a complex causal network of psychophysical conditions. I propose a revised account of this causal network in naturalistic terms, in order to place the reality of phenomenal consciousness on more secure ground, and immunize it from the illusions of Garfield-Madhyamaka Illusionism.
DescriptionSession 5
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/271201

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChaturvedi, A-
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-24T01:05:20Z-
dc.date.available2019-06-24T01:05:20Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationConsciousness and Fundamental Reality: Lessons from East Asian Philosophy Conference, Sun-Yat Sen University, Zhuhai, China, 11-13 June 2019-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/271201-
dc.descriptionSession 5-
dc.description.abstractJay Garfield has recently endorsed the bold claim of Illusionism about consciousness, which is that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. Any impression of direct access to a private inner life of phenomenal states is simply a conjuring trick of the brain. Further, to commit the cognitive error of thinking there are internal conscious states with a subjective phenomenal character is to fall prey to another pernicious illusion, namely the Myth of the Given. Of special interest is the support for Illusionism Garfield draws from the Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu and his Treatise on the Three Natures (Trisvabhāvanirdeśa). Against Garfield, I argue first that he miscontrues Yogācāra claims about the fundamental reality of consciousness, and that his Illusionism actually find more philosophical support from Madhyamaka Buddhism. Second, I offer a broader response against both Madhyamaka and Garfield by revisiting the Yogācāra notion of dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). This notion takes consciousness to be ultimately real even as it arises within a complex causal network of psychophysical conditions. I propose a revised account of this causal network in naturalistic terms, in order to place the reality of phenomenal consciousness on more secure ground, and immunize it from the illusions of Garfield-Madhyamaka Illusionism.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofConsciousness and Fundamental Reality: Lessons from East Asian Philosophy Conference-
dc.titleA Yogācāra Response to Madhyamaka Illusionism About Consciousness-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailChaturvedi, A: amitc@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityChaturvedi, A=rp02427-
dc.identifier.hkuros298218-

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