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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/gove.12543
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Article: Elite Bargains and Policy Priorities in Authoritarian Regimes: Agenda Setting in China under Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao
Title | Elite Bargains and Policy Priorities in Authoritarian Regimes: Agenda Setting in China under Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0491 |
Citation | Governance, 2021, v. 34 n. 3, p. 837-854 How to Cite? |
Abstract | What explains agenda outcomes in authoritarian regimes? Existing research attributes policy priorities to either the autocrat's survival needs or the co-optation of external interests. The former leaves out policy choices beyond the calculus of regime survival; and the latter elite power play that bears more immediately on government priorities than activities at the fringe. We hypothesize that officials working under autocrats who seek co-optative elite bargains are more likely to prioritize domain-specific concerns and less inclined to disrupt the status quo than those under leaders who rule with coercion. Our comparison of the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations of China reveals patterns consistent with these hypotheses: Hu's “steward” leadership is associated with increased agenda inertia and diversity, whereas policy priorities change in greater frequency and converge to a stronger focus under Xi's “strongman” rule. These contrasts are also clearer in policy venues closer to the central leader's direct control. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/308238 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.302 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chan, KN | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lam, WF | - |
dc.contributor.author | Chen, S | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-12T13:44:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-12T13:44:25Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Governance, 2021, v. 34 n. 3, p. 837-854 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0952-1895 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/308238 | - |
dc.description.abstract | What explains agenda outcomes in authoritarian regimes? Existing research attributes policy priorities to either the autocrat's survival needs or the co-optation of external interests. The former leaves out policy choices beyond the calculus of regime survival; and the latter elite power play that bears more immediately on government priorities than activities at the fringe. We hypothesize that officials working under autocrats who seek co-optative elite bargains are more likely to prioritize domain-specific concerns and less inclined to disrupt the status quo than those under leaders who rule with coercion. Our comparison of the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations of China reveals patterns consistent with these hypotheses: Hu's “steward” leadership is associated with increased agenda inertia and diversity, whereas policy priorities change in greater frequency and converge to a stronger focus under Xi's “strongman” rule. These contrasts are also clearer in policy venues closer to the central leader's direct control. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0491 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Governance | - |
dc.rights | Submitted (preprint) Version This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. Accepted (peer-reviewed) Version This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. | - |
dc.title | Elite Bargains and Policy Priorities in Authoritarian Regimes: Agenda Setting in China under Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chan, KN: kwachan@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Lam, WF: dwflam@hkucc.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chan, KN=rp02084 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Lam, WF=rp00570 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/gove.12543 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85090183673 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 329350 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 34 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 837 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 854 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000565780400001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |