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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.trc.2023.104234
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85164239448
- WOS: WOS:001040223600001
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Article: On urban co-modality: Non-cooperative and cooperative games among freight forwarder, carrier and transit operator
Title | On urban co-modality: Non-cooperative and cooperative games among freight forwarder, carrier and transit operator |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Co-modality Cooperative game Freight carrier Freight forwarder Non-cooperative game Transit operator |
Issue Date | 4-Jul-2023 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Citation | Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2023, v. 153 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper models a public transit system that can serve both passengers and urban freight, i.e., urban co-modality, and investigates the system-wide impacts of co-modality on existing urban freight forwarding service, freight carrier and urban transit services. In the co-modal system, we model one transit operator that serves passengers and provides co-modal services, one freight forwarder (an intermediary) that serves freight customers and uses freight transportation services provided by a freight carrier or the transit operator, and one freight carrier that provides services to the freight forwarder. We derive the analytical conditions under which co-modal operations can improve the profits of the freight forwarder, carrier and transit operator, and the consumer surpluses of freight customers and passengers compared with the status quo without co-modality. We also analytically and numerically compare the optimal operation decisions, the three operators’ profits, and the users’ welfare under different games among the operators (non-cooperative and cooperative games). Our results show that when the three operators are in a non-cooperative relationship, the freight carrier might have a profit loss due to the decreased freight units allocated to the direct road channel; whereas, both the freight forwarder and the transit operator would have profit gains from the co-modality. The numerical studies further reveal that to ensure a Pareto-improving co-modal system, the operators have to reduce the freight/transit service fare and co-modal transportation price. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330967 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 7.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.860 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ma, Mingyou | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Fangni | - |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Wei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Dixit, Vinayak | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-21T06:51:37Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-09-21T06:51:37Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023-07-04 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2023, v. 153 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0968-090X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330967 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>This paper models a public transit system that can serve both passengers and urban freight, i.e., urban co-modality, and investigates the system-wide impacts of co-modality on existing urban freight forwarding service, freight carrier and urban transit services. In the co-modal system, we model one transit operator that serves passengers and provides co-modal services, one freight forwarder (an intermediary) that serves freight customers and uses <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/freight-transportation" title="Learn more about freight transportation from ScienceDirect's AI-generated Topic Pages">freight transportation</a> services provided by a freight carrier or the transit operator, and one freight carrier that provides services to the freight forwarder. We derive the analytical conditions under which co-modal operations can improve the profits of the freight forwarder, carrier and transit operator, and the consumer surpluses of freight customers and passengers compared with the status quo without co-modality. We also analytically and numerically compare the optimal operation decisions, the three operators’ profits, and the users’ welfare under different games among the operators (non-cooperative and cooperative games). Our results show that when the three operators are in a non-cooperative relationship, the freight carrier might have a profit loss due to the decreased freight units allocated to the direct road channel; whereas, both the freight forwarder and the transit operator would have profit gains from the co-modality. The numerical studies further reveal that to ensure a Pareto-improving co-modal system, the operators have to reduce the freight/transit service fare and co-modal transportation price.</p> | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies | - |
dc.subject | Co-modality | - |
dc.subject | Cooperative game | - |
dc.subject | Freight carrier | - |
dc.subject | Freight forwarder | - |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative game | - |
dc.subject | Transit operator | - |
dc.title | On urban co-modality: Non-cooperative and cooperative games among freight forwarder, carrier and transit operator | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.trc.2023.104234 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85164239448 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 153 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1879-2359 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:001040223600001 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0968-090X | - |