File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1109/TSG.2022.3199366
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85136877915
- Find via
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Scopus: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems
Title | Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Benders decomposition Costs cybersecurity Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions false data injection cyber-attack Generators Load flow Mathematical models moving target cyber-attack Power system stability small-signal angle stability Stability criteria structure preserving model |
Issue Date | 1-Jan-2023 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
Citation | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2023, v. 14, n. 1, p. 635-648 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. To provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/338407 |
ISSN | 2021 Impact Factor: 10.275 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.571 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hou, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Song, Y | - |
dc.contributor.author | Sun, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Hou, Y | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T10:28:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T10:28:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023-01-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2023, v. 14, n. 1, p. 635-648 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1949-3053 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/338407 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. To provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid | - |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.subject | Benders decomposition | - |
dc.subject | Costs | - |
dc.subject | cybersecurity | - |
dc.subject | Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions | - |
dc.subject | false data injection cyber-attack | - |
dc.subject | Generators | - |
dc.subject | Load flow | - |
dc.subject | Mathematical models | - |
dc.subject | moving target cyber-attack | - |
dc.subject | Power system stability | - |
dc.subject | small-signal angle stability | - |
dc.subject | Stability criteria | - |
dc.subject | structure preserving model | - |
dc.title | Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TSG.2022.3199366 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85136877915 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 14 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 635 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 648 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1949-3061 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1949-3053 | - |