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- Publisher Website: 10.1109/TSG.2022.3156796
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85125744720
- WOS: WOS:000814692300063
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Article: Cybersecurity Enhancement for Multi-Infeed High-Voltage DC Systems
Title | Cybersecurity Enhancement for Multi-Infeed High-Voltage DC Systems |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Computer security Current measurement Cyber-attack cyber-defense cybersecurity enhancement Frequency control frequency deviation Frequency measurement high-voltage DC systems HVDC transmission multi-infeed DC systems. Power control Valves |
Issue Date | 1-Jul-2022 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
Citation | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2022, v. 13, n. 4, p. 3227-3240 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Composed of multiple two-terminal high-voltage DC (HVDC) transmission systems, a multi-infeed HVDC (MIDC) system exchanges massive power among multiple asynchronous AC systems. However, as an intrinsically cyber-physical system, an MIDC system could suffer from cyber-attacks, leading to massive power mismatches in multiple AC systems, and resulting in catastrophic consequences. Since the sequential responses of an MIDC system and interconnected AC systems are in different timescales, this paper first establishes a two-timescale model to evaluate the sequential impacts caused by cyber-attacks. Then, an event-triggered cyber-defense strategy is proposed to enhance the cybersecurity of an MIDC system by mitigating multiple non-simultaneous cyber-attacks. Whenever new cyber-attack events occur, the proposed cyber-defense strategy, which is mathematically modeled as a mixed-integer quadratic programming problem, is executed on-line and updated in an event-triggered manner. Simulation results on an MIDC system demonstrate that the low-cost and almost blind cyber-attacks can cause severe frequency deviations, and the proposed strategy can mitigate multi-cyber-attacks effectively. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/338411 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 8.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.863 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hou, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lei, S | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yin, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Sun, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Hou, Y | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T10:28:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T10:28:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-07-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2022, v. 13, n. 4, p. 3227-3240 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1949-3053 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/338411 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Composed of multiple two-terminal high-voltage DC (HVDC) transmission systems, a multi-infeed HVDC (MIDC) system exchanges massive power among multiple asynchronous AC systems. However, as an intrinsically cyber-physical system, an MIDC system could suffer from cyber-attacks, leading to massive power mismatches in multiple AC systems, and resulting in catastrophic consequences. Since the sequential responses of an MIDC system and interconnected AC systems are in different timescales, this paper first establishes a two-timescale model to evaluate the sequential impacts caused by cyber-attacks. Then, an event-triggered cyber-defense strategy is proposed to enhance the cybersecurity of an MIDC system by mitigating multiple non-simultaneous cyber-attacks. Whenever new cyber-attack events occur, the proposed cyber-defense strategy, which is mathematically modeled as a mixed-integer quadratic programming problem, is executed on-line and updated in an event-triggered manner. Simulation results on an MIDC system demonstrate that the low-cost and almost blind cyber-attacks can cause severe frequency deviations, and the proposed strategy can mitigate multi-cyber-attacks effectively. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid | - |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.subject | Computer security | - |
dc.subject | Current measurement | - |
dc.subject | Cyber-attack | - |
dc.subject | cyber-defense | - |
dc.subject | cybersecurity enhancement | - |
dc.subject | Frequency control | - |
dc.subject | frequency deviation | - |
dc.subject | Frequency measurement | - |
dc.subject | high-voltage DC systems | - |
dc.subject | HVDC transmission | - |
dc.subject | multi-infeed DC systems. | - |
dc.subject | Power control | - |
dc.subject | Valves | - |
dc.title | Cybersecurity Enhancement for Multi-Infeed High-Voltage DC Systems | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TSG.2022.3156796 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85125744720 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 13 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 3227 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 3240 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1949-3061 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000814692300063 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1949-3053 | - |