Clarifying the relationship between coherence and accuracy in probability judgments

Abstract

Bayesian approaches presuppose that following the coherence conditions of probability theory makes probabilistic judgments more accurate. But other influential theories claim accurate judgments (with high “ecological rationality”) do not need to be coherent. Empirical results support these latter theories, threatening Bayesian models of intelligence; and suggesting, moreover, that “heuristics and biases” research, which focuses on violations of coherence, is largely irrelevant. We carry out a higher-power experiment involving poker probability judgments (and a formally analogous urn task), with groups of poker novices, occasional poker players, and poker experts, finding a positive relationship between coherence and accuracy both between groups and across individuals. Both the positive relationship in our data, and past null results, are captured by a sample-based Bayesian approximation model, where a person's accuracy and coherence both increase with the number of samples drawn. Thus, we reconcile the theoretical link between accuracy and coherence with apparently negative empirical results.