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Conference Paper: On game theoretic rate-maximizing packet scheduling in non-cooperative wireless networks

TitleOn game theoretic rate-maximizing packet scheduling in non-cooperative wireless networks
Authors
Issue Date2007
Citation
2007 Ieee International Symposium On A World Of Wireless, Mobile And Multimedia Networks, Wowmom, 2007 How to Cite?
AbstractIn many practical scenarios, wireless devices are autonomous and thus, may exhibit non-cooperative behaviors due to self-interests. For instance, a wireless user may report bogus channel information in order to gain resource allocation advantages. In this paper, we analyzed the impact of these rationally selfish and non-cooperative behaviors on the performance of packet scheduling algorithms in time-slotted wireless networks. Using a mixed strategy game theoretic model, we found that the traditional rate maximizing packet scheduling algorithms can lead noncooperative devices to undesirable Nash equilibria, in which the wireless channel is used inefficiently. Motivated by this observation, we proposed a novel game theoretic scheduling approach that can lead to more efficient equilibria where all competing devices can achieve higher rates. © 2007 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/99263
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKong, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorKwok, YKen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWang, Jen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-25T18:22:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-25T18:22:29Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_HK
dc.identifier.citation2007 Ieee International Symposium On A World Of Wireless, Mobile And Multimedia Networks, Wowmom, 2007en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/99263-
dc.description.abstractIn many practical scenarios, wireless devices are autonomous and thus, may exhibit non-cooperative behaviors due to self-interests. For instance, a wireless user may report bogus channel information in order to gain resource allocation advantages. In this paper, we analyzed the impact of these rationally selfish and non-cooperative behaviors on the performance of packet scheduling algorithms in time-slotted wireless networks. Using a mixed strategy game theoretic model, we found that the traditional rate maximizing packet scheduling algorithms can lead noncooperative devices to undesirable Nash equilibria, in which the wireless channel is used inefficiently. Motivated by this observation, we proposed a novel game theoretic scheduling approach that can lead to more efficient equilibria where all competing devices can achieve higher rates. © 2007 IEEE.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartof2007 IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, WOWMOMen_HK
dc.titleOn game theoretic rate-maximizing packet scheduling in non-cooperative wireless networksen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailKwok, YK:ykwok@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityKwok, YK=rp00128en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/WOWMOM.2007.4351755en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-47749104906en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros131460en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-47749104906&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKong, Z=7006536683en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKwok, YK=7101857718en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWang, J=11439898400en_HK

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